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A Journey Towards Nuclear Pakistan

The circumstances in which Pakistan and India came into being were not very encouraging for a friendly and sound neighborhood. The unjust partition of sub-continent had already wounded the newly formed republic. Furthermore; very few of the divided assets were transferred to Pakistan. Thus Pakistan had to build its own governmental, financial and administrative infrastructure. Also India tried by all means to destabilize the country by giving rise to the issue of Kashmir just after partition. The war on Kashmir in 1947-48 further enhanced the distances. Also India blocked the water just after the independence of Pakistan at the time when crops were to be cultivated. India’s time-and-being intervention in the interior matters of Pakistan, its attacks on the economical and theoretical face of Pakistan, provoking political divergence , border issues and the non-provision of electricity were the basis that did not allow the two countries to start a new era of peace and prosperity.
The nuclear program had already been started in the subcontinent before partition in 1944 under the supervision of Homi Bhabba; who later proved to be the most political scientist of India. This program was shifted directly to India and was led by Homi Bhabba. Thus India already had a head start in the nuclear arms race.
Pakistan’s geostrategic position and its anti-communist military attitude against the communist state of China were the reasons that Pakistan and United States became natural allies. Pakistan joined a number of US sponsored alliances in exchange for the US military and economic assistance. Thus Pakistan took its initial steps about a nuclear program in late 1950s.Initially Pakistan seeked only civilian nuclear capabilities which begun with its participation in United States Atoms for Peace Initiative. In the same process the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) took place in 1956 as a result of the announcement made by Pakistan in October 1954 for the establishment of an atomic energy body. Pakistan also signed an agreement with US on cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy on August 11, 1955.
Journey Towards A Nuclear Pakistan
Things began to pick up for Pakistan in 1960s. Pakistan began its operation of first research nuclear reactor at PINSTECH under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
During 1964 when China’s first nuclear test seemed imminent, factions in India including Homi Bhabba were openly agitating for nuclear weapon. This proved to be a serious concern for Pakistan. Reports from fall of 1964 to mid 1965 indicate considerable concern by President Ayub Khan and then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In March, both Ayub Khan and Bhutto met with Chou En-lai in Beijing and developed Chinese support. . The Indo-pak war of 1965 also made Pakistan aware of the fact that it cannot depend on US or China to back it up in difficult situation and that it has to rely on its own resources and infrastructure .Shortly after this Bhutto said his famous words:
If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry but we will get one of our own.
The Pakistani engineers and scientists working in IAEA got the information about India’s work on nuclear program. So Munir Khan, director of Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of IAEA met with Bhutto in Vienna and revealed facts about Indian nuclear power program and a weapon production facility in Trom bay. Munir Khan concluded:
A (nuclear) India would further undermine and threaten Pakistan’s security and for her survival, Pakistan need a nuclear deterrent………………….
So Bhutto arranged a meeting between the President Ayub Khan and Munir Khan. After knowing the facts Ayub Khan told Munir Khan to estimate the cost of starting a nuclear program. At the time the cost was estimated not to be more than a hundred and fifty American dollars. But due to the weak economic condition of the country Ayub Khan rejected the proposal. Also the finance minister Muhammad Shoaib and Chairman I.H. Usmani were against the proposal. Thus Pakistan remained on strict non-nuclear weapon policy from 1956 to 1971.
After the 1971 war in which Pakistan not only had to face defeat but also lost  its one half, the uneasy relations of Pakistan with India, Afghanistan and Soviet Union urged Pakistan to work on the nuclear program and so the new President committed Pakistan  to acquire nuclear weapons at a secret meeting held in Multan on 24 January, 1972 shortly after the Bangladesh defeat to balance the disparity between the two countries’ military capabilities and not to allow India a strategic advantage.
When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto made his decision to proceed with a weapon program in 1972, an Indian team was already engaged for a few years in developing a prototype nuclear device. In fact, at the time the basic design for India’s first nuclear device was already complete.
India’s first nuclear test, known variously as smiling Buddha, the PNE (peaceful nuclear explosive) and most recently Pokhran-1 occurred on 18 May, 1974. This took the world especially Pakistan by shock and Pakistan had to increase its funding for nuclear program. India maintained that its nuclear program was based on their requirement to have a minimum nuclear deterrence, and that it was not against any specific country.
On the other hand, it has always been maintained by Pakistan that a nuclear threat posed to its security can neither be met with a conventional means of defense, nor by external security guarantees. Keeping in mind that the only time nuclear weapons were used, by US against an already defeated Japan, was when the enemy did not possess them and that Pakistan had no nuclear weapon then, it was a threatening situation for Pakistan.
Although PAEC had constituted a group to manufacture a nuclear weapon in march 1974, the progress was inefficient due to constraints imposed by nuclear exports control applied in wake of India’s nuclear test. At the time PAEC, headed by Munir Khan, was focused on plutonium route to nuclear weapons development using material from safeguarded Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).
Shortly after India’s atomic explosion, in mid 1974, Dr. A.Q. Khan wrote a letter to Bhutto and offered his services to the country which were instantly taken. Dr. A.Q. Khan used uranium enrichment and bought individual components instead of complete units to evade export controls.
In 1978 the Kahuta project was made known to the world. The disposed Prime Minister Bhutto said from his jail cell:
We know that Israel and south Africa have full nuclear capabilities-a Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization have this capability…………………………..the Islamic civilization is without it, but the situation (is) about to change.
US laid stress on Pakistan to accept the surveillance and the concerns of IAEA on the plan. American President Jim Carter, upon the attitude of Pakistan, stopped the economical aid to Pakistan for some time. Also the facilities given to Pakistan according to the Army training and educational pact were stopped.
The US and the Western countries laid stress on the government of Holland and an inter-ministry committee was made to compile a report on Dr. A.Q. Khan’s activities during his job and stay in Holland. Dr. A.Q. Khan was not convicted of any crime through this report.
The western media accused Dr. Khan to be a nuclear spy and greatest spy of the century.
In 1980, a case was processed on Dr. Khan in Holland convicting him of theft and other illegal acts. The judge of this case was a Jewish lady who sentenced Dr. Khan an imprisonment of 4 years in 1983. This case was proceeded without informing Dr. Khan or the government of Pakistan. The services of two famous lawyers were taken who appealed against the decision and after 2 years on 28 March, 1985 Dr. Khan was acquitted from the case.
On the other side, the western world specially the US along with Zionist entity of Israel, did all they could to derail the nuclear program with threats, sanctions and lures.
Pakistan had started Atomic Energy Project in Chashma near district Mianwali. India and Russia, through a combined effort, tried to destroy it by missile attack. But fortunately it fell in a nearby desert. India ilso tried along with Israel, a number of times, to attack Kahota but were not successful.
A number of spies were arrested within CIA who worked for other countries. One of them was Jonathon Pollard who was a spy of Israel and who was sentenced life-imprisonment on 4 March, 1987. He stole as many as 800 documents from CIA. A report was made on him namely a damage assessment and was submitted to the authorities on 30 October, 1987. This report was declassified on public pressure on 14 December, 2012. It showed that the government of Israel gave Pollard a responsibility to collect information on Pakistan’s Atomic Program. Pollard stole information from US’s secret institutes’ data centers in 1984-85 about Kahota uranium plant and other atomic plants and provided them to Israel. Most part of the report was censored and very little information was made public. It was mentioned on a page that Pollard provided documents about a processing plant near Islamabad. Pakistan has been mentioned totally 10 times in the report while most of the detail has censored.
Through this report and other declassified reports it has been maintained that the American government knew about Pakistan’s atomic plant since 1980. Though; at that time Pakistan was an alley of US in the Afghan-Russian war so no solid steps were taken.
In 1982 CIA reported the American President Ronald Raigen that Pakistan is working on the atom bomb. he immediately sent the deputy director of CIA Vernon Volsters to General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the then president of Pakistan. He assured the US General that Pakistan is not making any atom bomb. Although CIA was sure that Pakistan had at least processed enough uranium for one atomic bomb, the Pakistani president maintained the pressure somehow.
A document of CIA also discloses that the Raigen government did not want Pakistan to disclose its secret itself; because that would lead to the abandonment of the provision of aid to Pakistan by the US cabinet and this aid was the basis on which US and Pakistan were allies in the war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
Also from the time of President Jimmy Carter (1976-1980) the US government was taking secret steps to deprive Pakistan from accessing the sensitive technology needed for an atomic bomb. These secret activities did not allow the opponents of Pakistan’s nuclear program to take a solid step against the program.
The strategy of general Zia proved very successful. The US custom officers arrested a Pakistani-American Arshad Pervaiz in1987 under the accusation of smuggling for Kahuta center. Still Raigen government presented the congress a certificate saying that Pakistan has no nuclear weapon.
Dr. A.Q. Khan later asserted that Pakistan had acquired the capability to assemble a first generation nuclear device as early as1984.

Preparing To Build A Bomb
Pakistani work on weapon design began even before the start of work on uranium enrichment, under the auspices of the PAEC. Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman PAEC called a meeting, in March, 1974, to initiate work on an atomic bomb. Among those attending the meeting were Hafeez Qureshi, head of the Radiation and Isotope Applications Division (RIAD) at PINSTECH (later to become Member Technical, PAEC), Dr. Abdus Salam, then Adviser for Science and Technology to the Government of Pakistan and Dr. Riaz-ud-Din, Member (Technical), PAEC.

The PAEC Chairman informed Qureshi that he was to work on a project of national importance with another expert, Dr. Zaman Sheikh, then working with the Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO). The word bomb was never used in the meeting but Qureshi exactly understood the objective. Their task would be to develop the design of a weapon implosion system. The project would be located at Wah, appropriately next to the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), in the North West Frontier Province and conveniently close to Islamabad.

The work at Wah began under the undescriptive codename Research and Qureshi, Zaman and their team of engineers and scientists came to be known as “The Wah Group”. Initial work was limited to research and development of the explosive lenses to be used in the nuclear device. This expanded, however to include chemical, mechanical and precision engineering of the system and the triggering mechanisms. It procured equipment where it could and developed its own technology where restrictions prevented the purchase of equipment.

The first preparations for eventual nuclear tests also started early - in 1976. Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, and Member (Technical) and Dr. Samar Mubarak of the PAEC were dispatched to Balochistan to conduct helicopter reconnaissance of potential test sites with the assistance of the army 5 Corps located at Quetta. Over a span of three days, the PAEC scientists made several reconnaissance tours of the area between Turbat, Awaran and Khuzdar in the south and Naukundi-Kharan in the east.The PAEC requirement was for a mountain with a completely dry interior capable of withstanding an internal 20 kt nuclear explosion. A likely site was found in the form of a several hundred-metre tall granite mountain Koh Kambaran in the Ras Koh range (also referred to as the Ras Koh Hills).

The Ras Koh in the Chagai Division of Balochistan rise at their highest point to 3009 metres. After a one-year survey of the site, completed in 1977, plans were finalized for driving a horizontal tunnel under Koh Kambaran for a future test. (Brig. Muhammad Sarfraz, who had provided support to the PAEC survey team, was tasked by (now) President Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 with creating and leading the Special Development Works (SDW), which was entrusted, with the task of preparing the nuclear test sites.

The SDW was formally subordinate to the PAEC but directly reported to the Chief of the Army Staff. Meetings between SDW and PAEC officials and Zia-ul-Haq led to the decision to prepare a second site for a horizontal shaft. The site selected was located at Kharan, in a desert valley between the Ras Koh Hills to the north and Siahan Range to the south. Subsequently, the Chagai-Ras Koh-Kharan areas became restricted entry zones and were closed to the public.
The Wah Group had a weapon design - an implosion system using the powerful but sensitive HMX as the principal explosive - ready for testing in 1983.

The first cold test of a weapon (i.e. a test of the implosion using inert natural uranium instead of highly enriched uranium) took place on March 11, 1983 under the leadership of Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed of the PAEC. This test was conducted in tunnels bored in the Kirana Hills near Sargodha, home of the Pakistan Air Force's main air base and the Central Ammunition Depot (CAD).The Kirana Hills test tunnels were reportedly bored by the SDW after the Chagai nuclear test sites, i.e. sometime between 1979 and 1983. As in Chagai, the tunnels had been sealed after construction to await tests. As Prior to the cold tests, an advance team opened and cleaned the tunnels.

After clearing the tunnels, a PAEC diagnostic team headed by Dr. Mubarakmand arrived on the scene with trailers fitted with computers and diagnostic equipment. This was followed by the arrival of the Wah Group with the nuclear device, in sub-assembly form. This was assembled and then placed inside the tunnel. A monitoring system was set up with around 20 cables linking various parts of the device with oscillators in diagnostic vans parked near the Kirana Hills.One of the principal objectives of the test was to determine whether the neutron initiator (probably a polonium beryllium design similar to those used in the first US, USSR, UK, and Indian bombs) to reliably start a fission chain reaction in the real bomb. However, when the button was pushed, most of the wires connecting the device to the oscilloscopes were severed due to errors committed in the preparation of the cables.

At first, it was thought that the device had malfunctioned but closer scrutiny of two of the oscilloscopes confirmed that the neutrons had indeed been produced. A second cold test was undertaken soon afterwards which was witnessed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Lt. Gen. K.M. Arif and Munir Ahmed Khan. Between 1983 and 1990, the Wah Group developed an air deliverable bomb and conducted more than 24 cold tests of nuclear devices with the help of mobile diagnostic equipment. These tests were carried out in 24 tunnels measuring 100-150 feet (30-50 m) in length which were bored inside the Kirana Hills. Later due to excessive US intelligence and satellite attention on the Kirana Hills site, it was abandoned and the cold test facility was shifted to the Kala-Chitta Range. The bomb was small enough to be carried under the wing of a fighter/bomber such as the F-16 which Pakistan had obtained from the US.

The Wah Group worked alongside the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to evolve and perfect delivery techniques of the nuclear bomb using combat aircraft including conventional freefall, loft bombing, toss bombing and low-level laydown attack techniques, the latter requiring a sophisticated high speed parachute system. Today, the PAF has perfected all four techniques of nuclear weapons delivery using F-16, Mirage-V and A-5 combat aircraft.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests (The Last Moments)
The reelection of BJP to power in1998 was a turning point in the world affairs due to its decision to carry out India’s nuclear tests in 24 years. India had been poised on the brink of doing so for some years, with successive governments making active preparations to hold tests, going as far as to actually emplace nuclear devices in test shafts and to actually order the tests to be conducted. Support for an open declaration of nuclear weapons status had become popular with the Indian public in 1995 and was an official part of the BJP political platform. The successful execution of nuclear tests under the BJP government was thus all but a foregone conclusion.
Pakistan had operated the first tests of Ghauri on 6 April, 1998; 5 weeks before Indian tests. So the situation in which these tests were carried out was already quiet tensed.
The Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced in the afternoon of Monday,11 May,1998 in a hurriedly convened press conference that earlier that day India had conducted three nuclear tests. These tests were carried out in the desert area Pokhran of Rajisthan, 93 miles from Pakistani border. The world was even more astonished by the two days’ later announcement of two additional tests been conducted. India named these tests as operation Shakti.
India’s tests created an untenable situation for Pakistan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Pressure for tests spanned the political liberals like opposition leader Benazir Bhutto to the religious right so that a sense of balance of power might be restored and to deny Indian unilateral technical advantage. Benazir Bhutto reportedly went so far as to declare that:
If there is military capability to eliminate India’s nuclear capacity, it should be used.
Also pressure from military and from within Sharif’s administration particularly Foreign minister Gohar Ayub Khan became so much that it seemed that if Prime minister would not allow the tests, military might take over instead of 17 months later.
When the Indian tests were conducted Nawaz Sharif was away on a trip to central Asia. After reaching on 13 May a several hours meeting took place between him, senior military officials and senior government members. Pakistan’s security establishment had no advance information on these explosions. Many ministers thought it was the best time for Pakistan to test its nuclear device. The army personnel informed that they will be ready within a week to conduct an underground nuclear test on 24 hours’ notice.
As Pakistan was already under Pressler Amendment sanctions, Sharif ordered a report on the cost the country will have to bear due to the international sanctions if Pakistan conducts a nuclear test.
The same day president Clinton telephone Nawaz Sharif and urged him not to go ahead  with a test, asking him
Not to respond to an irresponsible act in kind.
The US also tried to lure Pakistan through aids and other benefits.
But most of the authorities were in favor of the tests. Foreign minister said in an interview
We are prepared to match India, we have the capability…………………We in Pakistan will maintain a balance with India in all fields.
He said
We are in a headlong arms race on the subcontinent.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said
We are watching the situation and we will take appropriate action with regard to our security.
Pakistan seemed to be unresponsive to the Indian tests at first but then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ordered on 18 May, 1998
Dhamaka kar dein (conduct the explosion)
Like India, Pakistan had made many preparations over the years and could thus organize a test effort on short notice. Preparations for the explosion were completed on 26 May. A code message was sent from Chaghi to Islamabad on the midnight of 27 May saying
Omelet is ready.
Green signal was given from Islamabad on 28 May. The Chaghi tunnel had already been made in 1980s. Pakistan operated 5 nuclear explosions on28 May in Chaghi, Balochistan and named the operation as chaghi-1. One more test was carried out on 30 May in Kharan desert and named chaghi-2. So a total of six nuclear explosions were carried out by Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said on 28 May:
Today, we have settled a score and have carried out five successful nuclear tests.
Sharif said post-test:
In the interest of national self-defense………………………….to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional.
With these tests Pakistan abandoned its nuclear ambiguity, stating that it would maintain credible minimum deterrent against India and also became the first Muslim state to acquire nuclear weapons capability.
Strategically this step of Pakistan was a disaster. Pakistan had suffered under the penalties of the Pressler amendment for years. If Pakistan had abjured testing at this point, its status on the world stage would have climbed dramatically as the responsible member of India- Pakistan confrontation. The symbolic significance of this step would have made Pakistan the idol of proponents of non-proliferation and likely would have led to the repeal of Presale’s Amendment sanctions. But by responding in kind, Pakistan not only lost all of these opportunities but also subjected itself to additional sanctions imposed in retaliation.
Geographical/Geopolitical impacts on Pakistan’s nuclear program
Geography controls the political environment of a country. There is no escape from one’s geography and from its impacts on one’s policies. It has often been said one can choose one’s friends or allies but seldom gets an option to choose one’s neighbors. These are many countries that cooperated Pakistan nuclear program and also who opposed it. The countries that cooperated this program were
Republic of China
United State
International cooperation
Republic of China
                    The people republic of China has been a strong vocal and avid supporter of Pakistan nuclear power generation program from the early on. The history of Chinese Pakistan cooperation dates back to the 1970’s when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as PM of Pakistan, first visited China. The strong academic interaction between Chinese and Pakistan scientists was began in the 1970’s.In 1986 the scientists from KRL and military Engineers of Pakistan army engineering corps built a HEU enrichment plant in Hanzhong province of PRC and provided technical assistance to China in weapon grade centrifuge technology for Chinese nuclear weapon. From the 1980’s to the present China has contracted with Pakistan to use of civil and electricity purpose use of nuclear technology.
China boosting Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities
  The deal would work the first foreign sale of this type of indigenous Chinese reactor which has 1100 MW capacity. The two reactors are started to be constructed near Karachi and expected to cost around $9.6 billion. The china national nuclear corporation signed contracts with sub-contractors in August to build a plant on a turnkey basis. Beijing will reportedly provide 80% of the financing through a soft loan.
Pakistan already has three operating nuclear power plants. One is located near Karachi and two others are located at the Chashma site in Punjab. China is in the progress of building two additional 350 MW reactors at the Chashma location (Chashma 3 & 4) that are scheduled to come on line by 2016. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal now exceeds 100 warheads. Its military doctrine has recently added short range, technical nuclear weapons. There are several countries that disagree with the Chinese position and have strong reservations about Chinese nuclear sales to Pakistan. A senior state department official commenting on the recent deal said that a transfer of new reactors to Pakistan extended beyond the cooperation that was grandfathered in when china was approved for membership in the NSG.
China – Pakistan power plant cooperation
Is cooperation set up by the governments of China and Pakistan to build nuclear power plants in Pakistan and China. Pakistan has shortage of electricity resulting in periodic blackouts all over the country. There nuclear plants will help alleviate power shortage in expanding economy. This will help Pakistan’s nuclear energy requirements of 8800 MW by 2030 by expediting the delivery of 6 nuclear power plants of 3000 MW each. Earlier, China has assisted Pakistan in setting up the Chashma nuclear power complex with Chashma 1 & 2 plants of the same capacity.
Second commercial nuclear power plant
As of 1990 contract, the second commercial nuclear power plant in Chashnup-1 in Punjab a 325 MW PWR supplied by China’s CNNC under IAEA safeguards. The main part of the plant was designed by Shanghai nuclear engineering research and design institute, based on Qinshan nuclear power plant. The commercial nuclear power plant began its operation in 2000. In 2005, China expanded its contract with Pakistan and vowed to build more nuclear power plants in Pakistan.
In 2005, both Pakistani and Chinese government adopted an energy security plan calling for huge increase in generating capacity to more than 160,000 MW by 2030. Pakistan’s government plans for lifting nuclear capacity to 8800 MW, 900 MW of it by 2015 and a further 1500 MW by 2020.
There were tentative plans for china to build two 100 MW PWR units at Karachi as Kanupp-2 & 3 but China then in 2007, deferred development of its CNP 1000type which is the only one able to be exported.

Announcement of Pakistan’s government of building nuclear power plants
In June 2008, The Pakistan’s government announced plans to build commercial nuclear power plants 3 and 4 at Chashma, each with 320-340 MW and costing PKR $129 billion, 80 billion of this from international sources, principally China. A further for China’s help with the project was signed in October 2008, and given prominence as a counter to the US India agreement shortly preceding it. In March 2009, SNERDI announcing that it was proceeding with design of Chashnup 3 and 4 with China Zhongyuan Engineering as the general contractor. The PAEC said, Beijing was financing 85 % of the US $1.6 billion project. Contracts for Chashnup I & II were signed in 1990 and 2000. In March 2013, Pakistan and China agreed to build up 1000 MW Chashnup 5 at Chashma Nuclear Power Complex. In July 2013, it was announced that Pakistani officials were considering approval of Kannup 2, a 1000 MW reactor to be built with assistance from China.
In May 2009, France agreed to cooperate with Pakistan on nuclear safety, which Pakistan's Foreign Minister called a 'significant development' related to the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to Pakistan. But later a spokesman for the French presidency was careful to rein in expectations, saying Mr. Sarkozy had "confirmed France was ready, within the framework of its international agreements, to co-operate with Pakistan in the field of nuclear safety." In October 2013, French Ambassador Philippe Thiebaud said "my country is ready to consider the request for enhancing civil nuclear cooperation in line with international obligations."
United States
At U.S.–Pakistan strategic dialogue 24 March, Pakistan pressed for a civil nuclear cooperation deal similar to that with India. One analyst suggested that such a deal was unrealistic at present but might be possible in 10–15 years.
In 2011, Dr. Irfan Yusuf Shami, Director-general of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and Makyo Maya Gawa, director general of Disarmament and Non-proliferation department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan signed an agreement for nuclear non-proliferation in Tokyo. Both countries agreed for stability in South Asia.
In 2011, during the state visit of President Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan seeks civil nuclear power cooperation with Japan, a similar deal that Japan and India had signed. According to Jang news group, Japanese Government had denied the nuclear power cooperation with Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Media, the Pakistan officials were highly disappointed with Japanese denial. On the other hand, Japanese officials were left disappointed as Pakistan had denied the Japanese request to support Japan's candidacy for permanent seat for the United Nations Security Council.
According to the Jang News, Pakistan offered Japan to provide technical assistance to control nuclear radiation, following the Fukushima reactor nuclear accidents, and Japanese officials have accepted Pakistan's offer. On 20 March 2011, Jang News reported that scientists from PNRA and PAEC were ready to leave for Japan as soon as IAEA gives an approval.

International reaction (After tests)
Pakistan tests were condemned by many non OIC nations. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1172 condemning both the Indian and Pakistani tests. The United States, Japan, Australia, Sweden, Canada and International Monitory Fund imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan. The Japanese Government recalled its Ambassador from Pakistan and suspended its foreign relations with Pakistan. All new US economic assistance to Pakistan was suspended in May, 1998, humanitarian aid continued. The composition of assistance to Pakistan shifted from grants towards loans repayable in foreign exchange. In the long term the sanctions were eventually lifted by President George W. Bush after Pakistan’s Gen. Musharraf allied Pakistan with the US in its war on terror. Having improved its finances, the Pakistani government ended its IMF program in 2004.
Arab League
The Egyptian based Arab Organization, denounced Pakistan’s nuclear tests calling them a dangerous step towards an arms race.
European Union
The EU said that its 15 Members States will be urgently considering sanctions against Pakistan’s similar to the ones already announced against India.
Director of Division of International Security and Nuclear and Space Affairs, Pedro Villagra said “we lament Pakistan’s tests because they generate a nuclear arms race that is not compatible with world’s peace and security.  Thus we urge Pakistan to subscribe to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban treaty. Villagara also warned that Pakistan and India should consider the situation because it can end in something that neither of the two countries will be able to control.”
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Donner deeply regretted Pakistan‘s 5 nuclear tests and added that sanctions would be levied within hours. “I strongly condemned the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan today (28th May, 1998).” Australia said it deplored Pakistan’s 6th nuclear test adding that it only compounded the international outrage expressed when Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test on 28th May, 1998.

Prime Minister Jean Chretien expressed dismay following Pakistan’s 5 nuclear tests. In an official statement he promised that bilateral relations with Pakistan would now be placed on hold and said that the Foreign Ministry would announce further measures later 28th May, 1998.
In reaction to Pakistan’s nuclear tests, the Egyptian government used the opportunity to sell the idea of nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East and implored Israel to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa said: “This nuclear test places the region of South Asia in a special position in view of the presence of two nuclear powers in it. Rendering the Middle East a region free from nuclear weapons is now a must for maintaining regional security.”
South Korea
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade spokesman Lee Ho Jin conveyed extreme disappointment and deep regret over Pakistan’s nuclear tests. Lee said “we strongly urge both countries India and Pakistan to declare suspension of any further nuclear testing as well as the nuclear weapon development program and join without delay the NPT and CTBT.
Reaction in Pakistan (after tests)
The directorate of Technical development of PAEC which carried out the Chagai tests issued the following statement soon after the tests: “The mission has on the one hand, boosted the morale of the Pakistani nation by giving it an honorable position in the nuclear world, while on the other hand it validated scientific theory, design and previous results from cold tests. This has more than justified the creation and establishment of DTD more than 20 years back. Though these critical years of nuclear device development, the leadership contribution changed hands from Munir Ahmad Khan to Ashfaq Ahmed and finally to Mubarakmand. These gifted scientists and engineers along with the highly dedicated team worked logically and economically to design, produce and test an extremely rugged device for the nation which enables the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from strength to strength.”

The Nuclear doctrine of State of Pakistan (otherwise referred as Option-enhancing Policy; is a theoretical concept of military strategy that promotes the deterrence by guaranteeing an immediate "massive retaliation" to an aggressive attacks against the state. This doctrine obtained various mathematical models of the "Game theory" for its effective operational use; it consists of numbers of set of strict principles, rules, regulations, and comprehensive instructions for the operational employment or non-operational employment of atomic weapons and other strategic systems associated with those weapons.

Persuasion for Effect

The doctrine is divided into four different threshold before the weapons are being operationally charged during the conventional and nuclear war with an aggressor state. In an event of war, for instance the war between India and Pakistan, the Indian Armed Forces numerical superiority and large stock of conventional armory and weaponry is most likely to overwhelm Pakistan. Therefore, in a deteriorating situation, when an Indian military aggression is more likely to penetrate through Pakistan's which cannot be restored by conventional means, the government would be left with no other option except to use nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation, as part of the first strike.

The rationale behind the doctrine is to prevent India from any military that would lead to the disintegration of the country, as it did in 1971. According to the sources, the doctrine advances and entails a stage-by-stage level of advancement in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter any aggressor state from attacking, as it is listed below:.

A public or private warning.
A demonstration atomic test of a small atomic device on its own soil (preferably at weapon-testing laboratories).
The use of nuclear weapons on Pakistan's soil against foreign (or India) attacking forces.
The use of nuclear weapons against critical but purely military targets on foreign soil, probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing the least collateral damage.

Levels of Threshold

The doctrine is not the part of the Minimum Credible Deterrence principle of Pakistan, however, the doctrine is integrated the nuclear dimension into its defense principle. According to the sources (after being obtained from Pakistan's nuclear command authority) published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the definition of four potential thresholds has been refined in the form of four thresholds which were first mentioned by officials at the nuclear command authority in late 2001.

Spatial Threshold: The armed and military penetration of Indian Armed Forces into Pakistan on large scale may elicit a nuclearize massive retaliation, if and only if the Pakistan Army is unable to stop such intervention. For instance, many analysts, including some Indians, believe that the Indus Valley— the "lifeline" of Pakistan— is one of many other "red lines" that Indian forces should not cross. The capture of key objectives in this crucial northeast–southwest axis might well provoke nuclear retaliation by Pakistan.

Military Threshold: The complete knockout or comprehensive destruction of a large part of Pakistan Armed Forces, particularly and most importantly the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), could lead to a quick nuclear response if Islamabad believed that it was losing the cohesiveness of its defense and feared imminent defeat. A senior ranking PAF officer maintained that "orders given to PAF are identical to the guidelines given to the NATO commanders during the Cold war crises. This criterion is even more important for the Pakistan Armed Forces because of its critical role in maintaining the country’s stability. As noted above, an attack on a nuclear installation has also been posited as a threshold. According to PAF, this level of threshold also included the chemical or biological weapons attack against Pakistan, would also respond to massive retaliation.

Economic Threshold: This level implicitly and explicitly refers for the countermeasure operations of Pakistan Navy. The economic strangulation and crash is also a potential threat to Pakistan, in which if Pakistan Navy is unable to counter it effectively. This primarily refers to a potential Indian Navy blockade of Sindh Province and coastal cities of Baluchistan Province, or the stopping of the Indus water flow. It could also refer to the capture of vital arteries such as the Indus.

Political Threshold: Finally, Pakistan's geostrategic, game theorists and political strategists and planners suggest that a destabilization of the country by India could also be a nuclear threshold if Islamabad has credible reason to believe that the integrity of the country was at stake. Stated scenarios are political destabilization or large-scale internal destabilization in which if Pakistan Marines are unable to stabilize it effectively. One example would be encouraging the breakaway of one or more Pakistan's provinces.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Command and Control
Pakistan believes that it can achieve deterrence against aggression through a combination of conventional and strategic forces. Pakistan has not agreed to a no-first-use but will not use nuclear weapon against non-nuclear weapon states.
Evolution of Pakistan's nuclear command and control system

Since 1975 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has been controlled by the National Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and the National Nuclear Command Committee (NNCC).

Since 1998 Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system has been transformed in four stages with the end result being a mature system.
During the first stage (1998–1999) Pakistan started to consider a more institutionalized command and control system.
During the second stage (2000–2001) Pakistan introduced its first reforms. On 7 February 2000, Pakistan announced a formal chain of command over nuclear weapons. This system was put into operation during 2001.
During the third stage (2001–2003) Pakistan further strengthened oversight over its nuclear weapons. This was a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which focused international attention on Pakistan and put pressure on Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons.
The final phase (2003–present) has been marked by the investigation into the A. Q. Khan nuclear network and related improvements in the command and control system, and export controls. Finally, in December 2007 President Pervez Musharraf transformed the ordinance establishing the system into a law.
Overview of Pakistan's nuclear command and control system

The System is based on a three-tier structure:
The National Command Authority (NCA),
The Strategic Plans Division (SPD),
The Three Services’ Strategic Forces Command.
The composition and role of each of these institutions is outlined in the following sections.
National Command Authority (NCA)
The government created the NCA in 2000 as the highest decision-making body in the nuclear command and control system. It has ten members including
The President (chairman),
The Prime minister (vice-chairman)
 The Chief of Army Staff.

It is responsible for formulating policies, deploying the strategic forces, coordinating the activities of all strategic organizations, negotiating arms control / disarmament, overseeing implementation of export controls, and safeguarding nuclear assets and sites. It has two committees:

    The Employment Control Committee (ECC): The ECC is responsible for directing policy-making during the peace time and deployment of strategic forces during war time, making recommendations on the evolution of nuclear doctrine, establishing the hierarchy of command and the policy for authorizing the use of nuclear weapons, and establishing the guidelines for an effective command and control system to safeguard against accidental or unauthorized use.
    and the Development Control Committee (DCC):The DCC is responsible for exercising technical, financial, and administrative control over the strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and overseeing development of strategic weapons programs.
Strategic Plans Division (SPD)
The SPD was created in 1998 as the permanent secretariat for the NCA. The SPD is headed by a director general who is appointed from the army and comprises some 50–70 officers from the three services. It is responsible for formulating policy options (nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine) for the NCA, implementing the NCA’s decisions, drafting strategic and operational plans for the deployment of strategic forces. Moreover, the SPD carries out the day-to-day management of Pakistan’s strategic forces, coordinates the activities of the different strategic organizations involved in the nuclear weapons program, and oversees budgetary, administrative and security matters. The SPD has eight directorates including
    The Operations and Planning Directorate,
    The Computerized, Control, Command, Communication, Information, Intelligence and Surveillance Directorate (CCCCIISD), The Strategic Weapons Development Directorate, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate and several divisions. One of the main divisions is the security division, which has a 10,000-strong force charged with guarding and protecting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
The Services' Strategic Forces Command
The Services Strategic Forces Command is raised from all the three services, which all have their respective strategic force commands. It is responsible for daily and tactical operational control of nuclear weapon delivery systems (the NCA is still responsible for overall strategic operational control). This operational control includes technical, training, and administrative control over missiles and aircraft that would be used to deliver nuclear weapons.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons And Delivery Platforms
To ensure Nuclear Weapon delivery, Pakistan started its missile program in 1987 under supervision of thes Chief of Army Staff and President Gen. Zia Ul Haq. Pakistan till now has mastered its work on many types of missiles including anti-aircraft missiles (Anza), anti-tank missiles (Baktar Shikn) and various conventional, non-conventional and battlefield ranged ballistic and cruise missiles.
In the start Pakistan’s missile programs was started as a response to Indian missile development and many Pakistan’s top military industrial complexes were given take to work on this program. Some of main Industrial Complexes attached with Pakistan’s Missile program are following:
Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL: now AQ Khan Research laboratories)
National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM)
Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO)
Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO)
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
Margalla Electronics
National Defence Complex (NDC)
Short-Medium Ranged Ballistic Missiles
In start ballistic missile programs like Shaheen, Ghauri and Ghaznavi were started but before them Hatf program was made feasible. In 1993-95 the program main objective was to develop Short-Medium range missiles to deter missile threat from India. In the start Pakistan tried importing M-11s from China but this plan cancelled due to international pressure. Ghaznavi Missile program was then initiated which was first Pakistani solid fueled based short range missile system with a range of 600 km and its payload was 500 kg. It was first tested in 1997 and considered as a major breakthrough. The design of Ghaznavi is said to be influenced from Chinese M-11, but military official claims Ghaznavi as an entirely Indigenous Pakistani platform.
Under same category of Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) Shaheen was developed by National Defence Complex, a spinoff of PAEC. Shaheen is solid fueled missile expanded well to SUPARCP, NESCOM and DESTO. Shaheen-1 entered in service in 1999. Its range is 750 km and can carry warhead of 1000kg. The improved variant, Shaheen-1A was tested in 2012 which falls in category of MRBM as its operational range is 1500km.
Shaheen-2 development started under flagship of NESCOM and it was tested on March 2004. Its operational range is 2500km and can carry payload of 1050kg. Shaheen-3 is rumored to be under development but no official statement from and high level delegation, representative or personnel has been recorded publically.
While Shaheen program was under development under NESCOM and NDC, a parallel program was given to KRL codenamed Ghauri, having aim of developing liquid fuelled ballistic missile. This platform is based entirely on North Korea’s Rodong-1. This missile was built by technology transfer by North Korea to KRL. By assistance of NDC, NESCOM and DESTO, Ghauri-1, after being heavily reverse engineered and redesigned was first tested on 8 April 1998. Its operational range was 1200km. Ghauri-2 was tested in 1990 having maximum range of 2000km and payload of 1200kg. Ghauri-3 which was under development by KRL was cancelled and in 2000 this program was halted. According to certain reports the operational Ghauri-1s and 2s are also being replaced by superior missiles (Shaheens) and its reason is believed to be the failed test of this missile in November 2012 in which a missile during test decomposed and disintegrated in flight.

Cruise Missiles
Pakistan tested its first cruise missile, Babur in 2005. Its operational range was 500km which later was increased to 700km. It is said to be based on Kh-55SM whose detailed production packages are said to be smuggled out of Ukraine. It is also said that it is based on US originated TOMAHAWK which crashed in Pakistani territory in 2001 during US airstrikes in Afghanistan but NESCOM (Babur developer) has rejected all such claims and theories. This missile was developed in response of Indian plans of purchasing US Patriot missiles. Babur is also being modified to be launched from submarines and make its SLBM version. This capability, if achieved will complete Pakistan’s nuclear tirade and give Pakistan Navy a nuclear Second Strike capability.
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) Raad, was developed by Air weapon Complex. At first it was expected that Babur Cruise missile will be modified to launch it from air but this platform seems to be a whole new system. Its operational range is 350km and can carry warhead of 450kg. It gives Pakistan Air Force (PAF) a second strike capability. It can attack the stationary enemy installments and has a pin point accuracy according to tests and claims made by official sources.
Battle Range Missiles
The Hatf system was the first project that was developed under this program. The Hatf project created three types of missiles that was developed jointly by KRL and the SRC; it’s in the BRBM category, active in the service of the Pakistan Army since 1992.
The Hatf–I is a unguided ballistic missile mounted on a TEL vehicle; it has a a range of 70km with capable of both conventional and nuclear payload of 500kg. The Hatf–IA is an improved version of the Hatf–I, with a range of 300km with a same payload.  Its final evolution led to the development of the Hatf–IB which includes a proper computer inertial guidance system with an extended range. The program evolved into final introduction of the Hatf–IV designation with a maximum range of 900km with a payload of 1,000kg, equipped with a computer inertial navigation system.
The latest battle-field range system to be produced is the Hatf–IX Nasr, which is widely believed to be a delivery system for tactical nuclear weapons. It was revealed in 2011 and it’s range is 60km. It carries a plutonium nuclear warhead instead of uranium nuclear warhead and is believed to be a solution of India’s Cold Start Doctrine.

Second Strike Capability
In Nuclear Strategy, the country’s assurity of having the ability to respond to a nuclear attack with a powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacked is termed as Second Strike Capability. To have this capability is considered vital in nuclear deterrence as otherwise the foes can try to win the nuclear war by first massive nuclear attack.
To have this capability builds support to follow no-first-use Nuclear Strategy. The objective of this strategy is to prevent first strike attacks for taking out nuclear arsenal and gives flexibility to retaliate with nuclear weapons.
There are mainly two types of platforms which gives such capability.
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM)
Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM)
SLMBs are expensive option to possess and launching an Inter-continental (Nuclear Tipped) Ballistic Missile through Submarine may has the probability of targeting a wrong country and its results can be disastrous.
This Concept of Second Strike Capability came from a US based kids comic book in early 20th century, in which US is shown retaliating to a Soviet massive nuclear strike on US cities. United States is believed to be first country to start work on and as well as acquire second strike capability.
Pakistan acquired second strike capability as early as 2007 when RAAD Nuclear capable Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) was tested. This missile is developed by Air Weapon Complex and can be carried by Mirage 3 & 5 Rose upgraded. Pakistan’s own JF-17 is also being tested and integrated to carry this weapon. This weapon can accurately hit its target as far as 350km.
When in 2009 a Neighboring rival country launched its first nuclear submarine which was capable of launching a ballistic missile, then Pakistan, to restore balance in region and to equip its navy with second strike capability, started work on modifying Babar land based cruise missile to be launched from submarine and make its SLBM version. Till now Pakistan is believed to have this capability but neither official announcements nor tests have been occurred. Work on the nuclear submarine is estimated to complete around 2018 China is believed to be helping Karachi Shipyard and Engineering works while the technology transferred from France with purchase of Agosta 90-B submarine is also believed to be very helping and significant.
Pakistan’s work on nuclear submarine has also been started in 2008 according to foreign intelligence and unofficial media reports and till now work is believed to be in advance stages. Pakistan is also in talks with china to buy up to 6 conventional submarines from china which are capable of launching a nuclear tipped ballistic missile and talks are in advanced stages. Analytics believe that a deal can be signed in early 2015; they also believe that this deal can be delayed till late 2016 due to financial issues.
Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. It is know that Pakistan has today approximately 100 to 110 active nuclear devices, installed on aircraft, missiles and other delivery systems. Read a report about Pakistan developed its nuclear arsenal and became proudly the first Muslim country to have "Nuclear Attack Capability".  It is a source of pride for every Pakistani and today we can answer to any sort of hostile power.

This Project is property of Air University Islamabad, Pakistan and copyright protected.

About Usama Shahzad

Usama Shahzad
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